Michigan Law Review
Volume 94

Issue 2

1995

True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v. Kentucky
in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
David A. Sutphen
University of Michgan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Race
Commons

Recommended Citation
David A. Sutphen, True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v. Kentucky in the Wake of St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 94 MICH. L. REV. 488 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol94/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v.
Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks
David A. Sutphen
INTRODUCTION

During the course of voir dire in State v. McRae, 1 a prosecutor
questioned the only African-American veniremember regarding
her views on the fairness of the justice system:
[Prosecutor:] Did you also understand that there may be certain jurors who have certain feelings or attitudes about whatever ... that[ ]
they couldn't for example, find somebody guilty because they just
don't think the system is fair .... [Veniremember:] I understand that.
[Prosecutor:] Okay. Knowing what you know about, you know, your
belief that the system maybe isn't perfect, should I be concerned? Is
it something where you don't think you could convict him if he's
proven-[Veniremember.j No, no, no. [Prosecutor.} Okay.
[Veniremember:] I would base my judgment on the evidence.2

After responding to this line of inquiry, which was not posed to any
of the white veniremembers, the prospective juror was peremptorily challenged by the State.3 Concerned that the prosecutor's
strike was racially motivated, defense counsel raised an objection
under Batson v. Kentucky. 4
After determining that the defendant had established a prima
facie case of discrimination,5 the trial judge afforded the prosecutor
an opportunity to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the peremptory challenge. In his defense the prosecutor offered
two justifications. First, that the stricken veniremember "had an
attitude that where she thought that basically, the system is unfair
to minorities, and the defendant's being black is - and her being
black would over compensate by basically letting this guy off. "6
1. 494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992).
2. 494 N.W.2d at 254-55.
3. See 494 N.W.2d at 253.
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In general, Batson prohibited state actors from exercising racially
motivated peremptory challenges on the grounds that they violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. At a minimum, this initial burden of production requires that the moving party demonstrate that he is a member of a protected class and that the state has exercised one or more of
its peremptory challenges against a member of this protected class. For a more detailed
discussion of the production requirements for Batson objections, see infra text accompanying
notes 51-64.
6. 494 N.W.2d at 256.
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Second, that she "thinks the whole jury process is [a] fraud. "7
Notwithstanding the defendant's claim that these explanations were
pretextual, the trial judge concluded that there "was an articulable
basis for the prosecutor's challenge in this case. "8 Thus, the case
proceeded to trial, and the defendant was eventually convicted of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct.9 On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, the trial judge's ruling was reversed
on the ground that the prosecutor's explanation for the challenged
strike was unworthy of credence because it was unsupported by the
voir dire transcript.10
The facts of State v. McRae are representative of a large number
of Batson cases in which the validity of a prosecutor's explanation
for a peremptory challenge is the main point of inquiry both during
the trial and on appeal. 11 This emphasis is largely a function of the
fact that, under Batson, proof of pretext is the legal equivalent of
proof of intentional discrimination.12 In other wor,ds, if a defendant
7. 494 N.W.2d at 256.
8. 494 N.W.2d at 256.
9. See 494 N.W.2d at 253.
10. In particular, the state supreme court noted that "the record of the prosecutor's examination of the juror in question fails to support the explanation given by the prosecutor for
striking the juror." 494 N.W.2d at 257. Accordingly, "[t]o allow the striking of this juror ...
in effect would allow a prosecutor to strike any fair-minded, reasonable black person from
the jury panel who expressed any doubt th[at] 'the system' is perfect." 494 N.W.2d at 257.
The justices' words reflect a keen awareness of one of the Supreme Court's underlying
concerns in Batson, namely that the purposeful exclusion of African-Americans from jury
service undermines "public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). The irony, however, is that race-based strikes, like the one
exercised in this case, contribute to the perception among blacks that the justice system is
unfair.
Batson also proscribed race-based prosecutorial challenges "on the assumption - or ...
intuitive judgment - that they [blacks] would be partial to the defendant because of their
shared race." 476 U.S. at 97. Notwithstanding this unequivocal language, the trial court in
McRae accepted, as legitimate, the prosecutor's contention that because the defendant and
excluded juror were both black, the veniremember "would over compensate by basically letting this guy off." McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 256.
11. Although Batson itself only dealt with the constitutionality of race-based peremptory
challenges by the State in criminal cases where the defendant and struck juror shared the
same race, the Supreme Court has since greatly expanded its scope. Consequently, as the law
currently stands, Batson applies in all cases - criminal and civil - to race or gender-based
peremptory challenges exercised by either party, regardless of whether that party shares the
same race or gender as the excluded juror. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994) (extending Batson to gender); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending
Batson to peremptory challenges exercised by criminal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (extending Batson to civil trials); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that Batson applied regardless of whether the criminal defendant and excluded juror were of the same race). Notwithstanding this wide scope of Batson,
this Note relies exclusively on the original Batson circumstances both for convenience and
because it is representative of the largest number of cases alleging the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "Johnson
carried his burden of proving intentional discrimination by establishing that the prosecutor's
four race-neutral explanations were a pretext"); Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 962 (3rd Cir.
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challenging a peremptory strike can convince a trial judge during
the final stage of the Batson hearing that the explanation offered by
a prosecutor in support of a peremptory strike is pretextual,13 then
she will prevail as a matter of law.14
In the process of determining whether a peremptory strike is
valid, lower courts rely on the TI.tie VII burden-shifting framework
originally laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green. 15 As a result, the order and presentation of proof
in Batson cases deliberately parallels the order and presentation of
proof in TI.tie VII intentional discrimination suits. In light of this
similarity, the Supreme Court's recent TI.tie VII ruling in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks 16 - that proof of pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework is not the legal equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination - raises questions regarding the role of
pretext evidence in the operation of the present Batson proof
structure.
This Note argues that notwithstanding Batson's reliance on the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the current standard of proof under Batson should not be altered along the lines
suggested by Hicks. Part I contends that Batson and its progeny are
an affirmative effort by the Court to eliminate racism in jury selection. Part II analyzes the Court's ruling in Hicks and specifically
focuses on the Court's reasons for rejecting proof of pretext as the
legal equivalent of proof of intentional discrimination in TI.tie VII
cases. Finally, Part III argues that there are fundamental differences between the TI.tie VII employment discrimination context
and Batson cases, and as such, the logic underlying Hicks breaks
1993); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121, 1121 (8th Cir. 1989); Bush v. State, 615 So. 2d
137 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); People v. Kindelan, 572 N.E2d 1138, 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
Foster v. Spartanburg Hosp. Sys., 442 S.E2d 624, 626 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); Miller-El v. State,
790 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
Throughout this Note I use the tenns pretext, pretext evidence and proof of pretext interchangeably. In all cases, they are intended to refer to the circumstance in which a defendant
raising a Batson objection offers evidence to prove or actually establishes that a prosecutor's
explanation for a peremptory challenge, for whatever reason, is unworthy of credence.
13. In a recent per curiam opinion, Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995), the Supreme
Court clarified the stage at which it is appropriate for a trial judge to rule on the legitimacy of
a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory challenge. In particular, the Court held that so
long as the prosecutor's reason(s) is facially valid then the trial court must withhold judgment
until the final stage of the Batson hearing in which the defendant is provided an opportunity
to establish that the prosecutor's explanation is pretextual. 115 S. Ct. at 1770-71.
14. See, e.g., Trahan v. City of Oakland, 15 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1993), available in LEXIS,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 37498; Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 229 (2nd Cir. 1987); Tursio v.
United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C. 1993); Oliver v. State, 826 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. Ct.
App.1992).
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) (citing
McDonnell Douglas for the rules of the prima facie burden of proof); see also infra notes 4752 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of the McDonnell-Doug/as framework).
16. 113 s. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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down when applied in cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
I. BATSON.' ITS PURPOSE AND APPLICATION
This Part examines the Court's landmark ruling in Batson and
describes how lower courts have applied it. Section I.A argues that
Batson was a reaction to Swain v. Alabama, and was intended to
ease the burden of proof on criminal defendants challenging the
States' use of peremptories. Section I.B explores the operation of
Batson's three-part proof structure. Section I.C argues that establishing pretext is presently the critical question in Batson cases.
A. An Interpretation of Batson
To understand Batson it is important to recognize that Batson
was a direct response to an earlier, much maligned, peremptory
challenge case: Swain v. Alabama.11 The decision in Batson was a
clear rejection of the notion embraced by the Court in Swain that it
was reasonable to assume that a prosecutor's strikes were based on
legitimate considerations. Section I.A.l argues that Batson eased
Swain's excessive burden of proof and reversed Swain's presumption regarding the discriminatory potential of peremptory challenges. Section I.A.2 contends that in addition to relieving Swain's
excessive burden of proof, Batson sought to alleviate two other
harms caused by discriminatory peremptories: harm to the excluded juror, and harm to the integrity of the justice system.
1. Batson as a Reaction to Swain
For over a century the Supreme Court has held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racebased exclusion of blacks from service on grand and petit juries.18
It was not until 1965, however, that the Court first addressed the
specific question of whether race-based peremptory challenges violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In Swain v. Alabama, 19 the Court
17. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). For criticism of Swain, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499, 510 n.12 (Mass.) ("In light of the extensive criticism of Swain, and in recognition
of the negligible protection that decision offers to a defendant asserting the right to trial by
jury of peers, we take this opportunity to depart from applying its rule perfunctorily .... "),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 717 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
("[T]he challenge allowed in Swain may be too limited.... [T]he California experience with
the Swain rule has resulted in numerous attempts to meet the Swain burden with no success
•..." (citations omitted)); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 164 (1989)
("Under Swain, the Constitution guaranteed minorities only an opportunity to reach the
finals before a government officer discriminated against them.").
18. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
19. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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recognized that, in principle, proof of the systematic exclusion of
blacks through the State's use of peremptory challenges was sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution.20
Nevertheless, in practice, the burden of proof required to prevail under Swain was nearly insurmountable. In order to show a
constitutional violation, a defendant had to demonstrate that the
prosecutor challenged blacks "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the
victim may be."21 As a result, Swain did little, on a case-by-case
basis, to deter prosecutors from challenging veniremembers solely
on the basis of race.22
By the mid-1980s, faced with compelling evidence of the continued use of racially motivated peremptory challenges,23 the Supreme
Court decided to reconsider its primary holding in Swain. In Bat20. Although the· Court embraced the principle that " 'fi]urymen should be selected as
individuals, ·on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race,' "380 U.S.
at 204 (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950)), it appeared reluctant to lessen the
evidentiary burden placed on defendants challenging peremptory strikes.
If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the
presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof might support
a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is
being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population.
380 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).
21. 380 U.S. at 223. One of the most disturbing aspects of the Court's ruling in Swain was
that although "there never ha(d] been a Negro on a petit jury in either a civil or criminal case
in Talladega County," the majority nonetheless ruled against Swain on the grounds that he
lacked sufficient evidence to establish that discrimination occurred at his trial. 380 U.S. 22324. In fact, Justice Goldberg noted in his dissent that "[s]ince it is undisputed that no Negro
has ever served on a jury in the history of the county, and a great number of cases have
involved Negroes, the only logical conclusion ... is that in a good many cases Negroes have
been excluded by the state prosecutor." 380 U.S. at 235 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
22. At least one commentator noted that "[a]lthough courts are inclined to say that the
defendant's burden of showing ... systematic exclusion by the prosecutor 'is not insunnountable,' experience has clearly indicated the 'virtual impossibility' of doing so." 2 WAYNER.
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, C!uMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(d), at 739 (1984) (footnote
omitted). In fact, during the two decades before the Court decided Batson, there were only
two reported cases in which a plaintiff prevailed under the Swain evidentiary standard. See
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 45, Batson (No. 84-6263) (citing State v. Brown,
371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979)), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Congressional Info. Serv.); and see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
23. One clear illustration can be found in the Dallas County, Texas, District Attorney's
Office's instruction manual provided to new prosecutors. In particular, the instructions regarding jury selection read:
III. What to look for in a juror
A. Attitudes
1. You are not looking for a fair juror but rather a strong, biased and sometimes hypocritical individual who believes that Defendants are different from
them in kind, rather than degree.
2. You are not looking for any member of a minority group which may subject
him to oppression - they almost always empathize with the accused.
3. You are not looking for free-thinkers and flower children .•••
Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal
Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 192, 224 (1978) (emphasis added).
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son v. Kentucky, 24 the Court held that race-based peremptory challenges in a criminal case where the defendant and struck juror are
both black violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
James K. Batson, a black man, was arrested and charged by the
State of Kentucky with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods.2 s During the course of jury selection, the State used four
of its six peremptory challenges to excuse all four black
veniremembers.26 In response, Batson moved to discharge the jury
on the ground that the State's challenges violated his constitutional
rights under the Fourteenth Am.endment.27 The trial judge, however, rejected Batson's argument noting that the parties could
"strike 'anybody they want to.' "28 The Supreme Court ultimately
granted certiorari and ruled that race-based peremptory challenges
were unconstitutional and that, in order to prevail, a criminal defendant need not prove that the individual prosecutor had a history
of exercising discriminatory strikes.29
The Court in Batson clearly rejected the notion underlying
Swain, that it was reasonable - even if the State had peremptorily
challenged all black veniremembers - to assume that a prosecuAnother previously circulated jury selection guide instructed Dallas County prosecutors
not to "take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury no
matter how rich or well educated." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103, n.3 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting the DALIAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986, at 29). Other examples include checklists advising attorneys to establish "prototypes" and initially decide
whether to exclude individuals on the basis of their race. See Kelner, Jury Selection: The
Prejudice Syndrome, N.Y. STATE B.J., Feb. 1984, at 35-38.
These practices led Justice White to comment that "the practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much so
that I agree that an opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs." 476 U.S. at
101 (White, J., concurring).
24. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
25. See 476 U.S. at 82.
26. See 476 U.S. at 83.
27. See 476 U.S. at 83. The case was ultimately decided solely on the basis of Batson's
Fourteenth Amendment claim. In the eyes of the Court:
Petitioner has framed his argument in .•. an apparent effort to avoid inviting the Court
directly to reconsider one of its own precedents.... [R]esolution of petitioner's claim
properly turns on application of equal protection principles and [we] express no view on
the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments.
476 U.S. at 84 n.4.
28. 476 U.S. at 83.
29. See 476 U.S. at 96; see Dave Harbeck, Comment, Eliminating Unconstitutional Juries:
Applying United States v. De Gross to All Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in
the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 11 MINN. L. REV. 689, 697 n.55 (1993).
As Justice Marshall commented, "[f]or evidentiary requirements to dictate that 'several
must suffer discrimination' before one could object would be inconsistent with the promise of
equal protection to all." 476 U.S. at 95-96 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 965
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
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tor's strikes were based on legitimate considerations.30 In fact, Batson explicitly recognized that peremptory challenges allow "those
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate"31 and that
Swain's "crippling burden of proof" essentially had immunized
such challenges from constitutional review.32
Batson recognized that the burden in Swain had been insurmountable and established a new three-stage analysis, based on TItie VII, which was clearly aimed at malting objections to
discriminatory peremptory challenges more viable.33 Furthermore,
the Court stated that in meeting Batson's lower burden of proof,
the objecting party could rely on the fact that the peremptories offer the opportunity to discriminate.34 The Batson Court's decision
to lessen the standard of proof required to show a constitutional
violation makes it substantially easier for a defendant to prevent a
prosecutor from exercising racially motivated peremptory
challenges.
2. Batson's Three Harms
Although Batson primarily focused on the constitutional harm
suffered by the criminal defendant as a result of race-based peremptory challenges,35 the Court also identified two additional
harms, arising from discriminatory peremptory challenges: the
harm to the excluded juror, and the harm to the integrity of the
justice system as a whole.36 In the cases that expanded BatsonPowers v. Ohio,37 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 38 Georgia v.
30. According to the Swain Court, "it [was] permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on
acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved
and the particular crime charged." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 {1965).
31. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 {1953)).
32. See 476 U.S. at 92-93 (noting that "[s]ince ... Swain has placed on defendants a
crippling burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny").
33. See 476 U.S. at 92-93 (rejecting Swain's "crippling burden of proof" in favor of Title
VII's three-part test). For a discussion of Batson's three-part test see infra section I.B.
34. See 476 U.S. at 96 ("[T]he defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there
can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits
'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" (quoting Avery, 345 U.S. at 562)).
35. See 476 U.S. at 86 (holding that "[p]urposeful racial discrimination in the selection of
the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure").
36. See 476 U.S. at 87-88; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., 114 S. a. 1419, 1427 (1994)
(reasoning that "[t]he community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation
of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system
that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders").
37. 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that Batson applies regardless of whether the criminal
defendant and excluded juror are of the same race).
38. 500 U.S. 614 {1991) (ruling that Batson applies in the context of civil as well as criminal trials).
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McCollum,39 andJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 4 0-the Court specifically
focused upon the impact of these two harms. Essentially, what
emerges from these four subsequent cases is the fundamental principle that the legitimacy of our system of justice is severely undermined by the continued existence of racial discrimination in the jury
selection process. More specifically, the Court reasoned that:
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is
fundamental to our democratic system. It not only furthers the goals
of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of equality under the law
- that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the
chance to take part directly in our democracy.... When persons are
excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized.41
The Court's unwavering adherence to this important principle illus-

trates the significance it places on the struggle to eradicate racial
discrimination from the process by which we select juries.42
B. Batson's Three-Stage Analysis .
In order to lessen Swain's burden of proof and to facilitate the
consideration of indirect and circumstantial evidence in cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, Batson
adopted the three-stage Title VII disparate treatment burdenshifting proof structure established by the Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green. 43 The Court's choice of this framework
reflected its recognition of two important principles. First, that the
ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment remains with the criminal defendant.44
39. 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that Batson applies to race-based peremptory challenges
exercised by defendants).
40. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding that the principles underlying Batson also apply to
gender-based peremptory challenges).
41. 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
42. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty notwithstanding undisputed evidence of
its disparate impact on blacks), it would be disingenuous to argue that the Court's grave
concern over eradicating racial discrimination in the jury-selection process extends equally to
all phases of our justice system.
.
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) ("[O]ur
decisions concerning 'disparate treatment' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
have explained the operation of the prima facie burden of proof rules." (citing McDonnell
Douglas)). The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was a black civil rights activist who had been
refused reemployment as a mechanic on the grounds that he had participated in a series of
illegal protests.
44. See 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
Those bringing a challenge under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must establish discriminatory intent in order to prevail. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). In other words, the " 'invidious quality' of governmental action [i.e. peremptory challenges] claimed to be racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at
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Second, that it is inherently difficult to prove intentional discrimination without reference to circumstantial evidence.4s As a result, the
Court noted that in weighing whether a defendant has carried his
burden of persuasion, courts should make a careful and searching
inquiry into any evidence that may be relevant to establishing discriminatory intent.46 To facilitate this inquiry, the Court borrowed
the Title VII proof structure..
This section examines the workings of this burden-shifting
scheme. It explores first how the scheme operates in its original
Title VII context and then how it works under Batson.
1. The Roots of Batson 's Proof Structure
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established a
burden-shifting proof structure for resolving Title VII intentional
discrimination cases.47 Under this framework, a plaintiff initially

240); see also Benjamin Hoom Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After
Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment
Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REv. 191, 194-95 n.18 (arguing that peremptory challenges are examples of disparate impact and that Batson was an effort to make findings of intentional discrimination possible).
Note also that a " 'finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to
appropriate deference by a reviewing court." 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 {1985)). Moreover, because "the trial judge's findings in the
context under consideration here largely will tum on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing
court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (quoting
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575-76).
45. See 476 U.S. at 93-96. Courts consistently have held that due to the inherent difficulty in proving intentional discrimination, "[i]nsistence upon direct ..• evidence would create insurmountable problems of proof for plaintiffs." King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 {1987).
46. In particular, the Court noted that "a court must undertake 'a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.'" 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 {1977)).
47. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792. The allocation of shifting burdens in disparate treatment cases was designed to allow plaintiffs lacking a "smoking gun" to prevail
under Title VII. Courts recognized that an "[i]nsistence upon direct • . . evidence would
create insurmountable problems of proof for plaintiffs in discrimination cases." King, 778
F.2d at 881.
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must prove a prim.a facie case48 of intentional discrimination in order to state a valid Title VII claim.49
If the plaintiff is successful at this first stage, the burden of production shifts to the employer at the second stage to come forward
with a "legitimate non-discriminatory reason" for its adverse employment action.so For example, at this second stage an employer
might contend that the plaintiff was fired because of poor performance evaluations or frequent tardiness. It does not matter, for purposes of stage two analysis, if the proffered reason is credible, or if
it was the real reason for the employer's action. All that matters is
that the reason asserted be facially nondiscriminatory.
Once the employer offers a facially valid justification, stage
three of the McDonnell Douglas framework affords the plaintiff an
opportunity to demonstrate that the reason proffered is pretextual
and that race was the real reason for the adverse employment action.51 During this final "pretext" stage of proof, plaintiffs can pre48. The term prima facie case in the Title VII context "denote[s] the establishment of a
legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption," rather than "the plaintiff's burden of producing
enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981). According to the Court:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this
largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
setting.
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 {1978) (citation omitted).
49. In particular, the plaintiff must prove the following four elements: (1) he "belongs to
a racial minority"; {2) "he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants"; (3) "despite his qualifications, he was rejected"; and (4) "after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
50. In Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248, {1981), the Supreme Court clarified the exact nature of
this second-stage burden. Specifically at issue in Burdine was whether the employer's
second-stage burden is one of production or persuasion. In other words, the Court was asked
to decide whether the McDonnell Douglas standard required that a Title VII defendant persuade the court that it was "actually motivated" by the reason(s) proffered; or, whether it was
sufficient for an employer simply to introduce evidence that "raises a genuine issue of fact as
to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." 450 U.S. at 254-55.
The distinction between these two production requirements is significant. Under the
former, an employer would be required not only to come forward with a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its action but also to convince the factfinder by a preponderance of the evidence that it actually was motivated by the proffered reason. By contrast,
under the latter production requirement, an employer would satisfy its burden simply by
articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of whether it proved to be the
"true" motivation behind the adverse employment action. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 {1993) (holding that "[b]y producing evidence {whether ultimately persuasive or not) of nondiscriminatory reasons, petitioners [defendants] sustained
their burden of production").
51. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. This final stage does not occur, however, if
the defendant is unable to articulate a "legitimate nondiscriminatory" reason for the adverse
employment action, namely one that on its face does not violate Title VII. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in her favor because the de-
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vail either directly, by showing that a discriminatory purpose more
likely than not motivated the employer, or indirectly, by proving
that the employer's explanation lacks credibility.52 For instance,
under the first option, a plaintiff might offer evidence establishing
that his employer had a history of using racial epithets to refer to
him and other black employees. By contrast, under the second option a plaintiff could establish that his firing was racially motivated
because white employees with equally poor or worse performance
evaluations or similar tardiness problems did not lose their jobs.
2. How Batson's Proof Structure Operates
Under Batson's first stage, a criminal defendant, like a Title VII
plaintiff, must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In particular, the Batson Court stated that:
[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove veniremembers of the defendant's race. Second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no
dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' Fmally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremembers from the petit jury on account of their race.53

fendant has failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination previously established by the
prima facie case. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
52. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Marina C. Stzteinbok provides a helpful explanation of
these two avenues of proof. She notes the following:
[U]nder McDonnell Douglas, both the type of evidence the plaintiff introduces and the
method of proof itself are indirect. The distinction Burdine established between "direct"
and "indirect" modes of proving pretext must be understood in this context. The plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence whether pretext is proved directly or indirectly. By invoking the "more likely" strand of Burdine, the plaintiff proves discrimination
affirmatively (i.e. "directly") through the introduction of circumstantial evidence. By
invoking the "unworthy of credence" strand, however, the plaintiff proves discrimination
"indirectly," without needing to build an affirmative case that the defendant more likely
than not discriminated.
Marina C. Stzteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Disparate Treatment
Claims After Aikens, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1118 n.34 (1988).
53. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (citations omitted).
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If successfu1,s4 at the second stage of proof the burden of production then shifts to the State to offer a facially valid race-neutral explanation for the strike.ss
Recently, in Purkett v. Elem,56 the Supreme Court clarified the
exact nature of this second stage burden under Batson. The Court
specifically addressed the question of whether a criminal defendant,
at the second stage of the Batson framework, is entitled to judgment in his favor if a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory
challenge appears implausible on its face. 57 In reversing the Eighth
Circuit, which had ruled in favor of the defendant, the Court held
that the Court of Appeals erred "by ... requiring that the justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least
minimally persuasive."58 Essentially, therefore, Elem represents
the Burdine of the Batson line of cases, insofar as it stands for the
proposition that at the second stage of proof the challenged party
bears a burden of production, not persuasion.s9
Notwithstanding Elem, a prosecutor will not succeed in rebutting the prima facie case at the second Batson stage merely by asserting that he sensed that a black juror would be partial to the
defendant because they were both black.60 Batson cautioned that
prosecutors may not overcome the inference of discrimination simply by stating that their strike was in good faith and not motivated
54. Among the considerations the Court mentioned as relevant to the determination
whether a prima facie case has been established were "a 'pattern' of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire" and the "prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges." 476 U.S. at 97.
The Court also noted that, in weighing the evidence in support of a prima facie case, "the
trial court must undertake a 'factual inquiry' that 'takes into account all possible explanatory
factors' in the particular case." 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
630 (1972)).
55. 476 U.S. at 97. Although the state is required to come forward with some
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause." 476 U.S. at 97.
56. 115 s. Ct. 1769 (1995).
57. In Elem, the prosecutor had justified his strike on the ground that the veniremember
"had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared
to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder
length, curly, unkempt hair." 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
In reaction to the majority's ruling, the dissenters noted that:
The Court's unnecessary tolerance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, together with its assumption that there is a difference of constitutional magnitude between
a statement that "I had a hunch about this juror based on his appearance," and "I challenged this juror because he had a mustache," demeans the importance of the values
vindicated by our decision in Batson.
115 S. Ct. at 1775-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. 115 S. Ct. at 1771.
59. See supra note 50 (discussing the Court's ruling in Burdine).
60. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986); see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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by a discriminatory animus.61 Instead, the prosecutor must offer a
race-neutral explanation that is relevant to the case at hand.62
Ultimately, if a trial or reviewing court determines at the third
stage that the reasons asserted by the prosecutor at stage two are
insufficient to overcome the inference of discrimination, the criminal defendant is entitled to the appropriate relief.63 For example, a
prosecutor might claim that her peremptory challenge was based on
her belief that a black veniremember's prior criminal record would
make him a bad juror for the State's case. Although this explanation is legitimate on its face, and therefore satisfies the State's
second-stage burden under Elem, a defendant could still prevail at
the third stage if he could establish that the prosecutor's explanation was pretextual. In other words, if the defendant could prove
that the black veniremember who was struck did not actually have a
criminal record, or that white veniremembers with similar records
had not been struck, then the defendant would be entitled to relief
under Batson.
In many cases, the presence of one or more of the following five
factors will support a defendant's conclusion that the prosecutor's
explanation is pretextual:
1. The reason given for the peremptory challenge is not related to the
facts of the case; 2. There was a lack of questioning to the challenged
juror or a lack of meaningful questions; 3. Disparate treatment persons with the same or similar characteristics as the challenged juror were not struck; 4. Disparate examination of members of the venire, i.e., questioning a challenged juror so as to evoke a certain
response without asking the same question of other panel members;
and 5. An explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is
not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically.64
Consequently, under the Batson proof structure, if the defendant is

successful in proving pretext by establishing one of these factors, he
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
C. Pretext Evidence in the Batson Proof Structure
In accordance with the explicit mandate of Batson, lower courts
have employed the McDonnell Douglas framework in cases alleging
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Increasingly, the
61. See 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting in part Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 {1972)).
62. See 476 U.S. at 98.
63. See 476 U.S. at 100; see also State v. Singfield, No. 16253, 1994 WL 30482, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1994) ("The third step of the Batson analysis requires the court to reach the
ultimate issue of whether the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation was merely a pretext

....").

64. Edwards v. State, Nos. 05-91-00651-CR & 05-91-00652-CR, 1992 WL 276483, at *3-4
(Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1992) (citing Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988)).
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focus of inquiry in such cases has shifted away from the prima facie
case toward an assessment of the adequacy of the prosecutor's proffered reasons for the challenged strike.65
One explanation for this high degree of scrutiny at the pretext
stage is the standard of proof that is required to prevail under Batson. Because proof of pretext under Batson is the legal equivalent
to proof of intentional discrimination, many state and federal
judges, in order to expedite Batson hearings, ask prosecutors to offer a race-neutral explanation for their challenges even before a
prima facie case is established.66 The enormous significance that
trial judges place on pretext evidence means that an increasing
number of Batson motions are decided solely on the basis of
whether the trial judge is convinced that the. prosecutor's proffered
reasons are pretextual.67
In light of the wide range of explanations considered raceneutral under Batson, 68 however, prosecutors readily can succeed in
exercising discriminatory peremptory challenges.69 For example, a
prosecutor legitimately can justify a strike based on the fact that the
excluded juror has a relative who has been prosecuted for a crime,70
lives in the same county as the defendant,71 wears dark glasses,72
wears a hat,73 or is young or unmarried,74 all of which make it extremely difficult for defendants to prevail on Batson motions at
trial. Moreover, due to the factual nature of a trial judge's ruling
65. See Jeffery S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 511, 583 n.380 (arguing that this shift in focus
"reflects the desire for quick determination of Batson objections").
66. See id. (listing examples of circuit court opinions that have benefited from this
practice).
67. A failure on the part of the defendant to "respond or offer any rebuttal to the prosecutor's reasons precludes appellate consideration of the issue of pretext." Id. at 590.
68. For a detailed discussion of the wide range of reasons considered legitimate under
Batson, see Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 229 (1993) (arguing in particular that
prosecutors' strikes can be classified into 12 basic categories - Age, Occupation, Unemployment, Religion, Demeanor, Relationship with a Trial Participant, Lack of "Intelligence," Socioeconomic Status, Residence, Marital Status, Previous Involvement with the Criminal
Justice System, and Jury Experience - many of which serve as pretexts for racial
discrimination).
69. See generally id. In particular, Raphael & Ungvarsky argue that
[I]n almost any situation a prosecutor can readily craft an acceptable neutral explanation
to justify striking black jurors because of their race. This is especially true when only a
single or a few jurors are struck because it is less obvious that a pattern of striking blacks
is involved.
Id. at 236.
70. See People v. Chambie, 234 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 (Ct. App. 1987).
71. See Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 583 (Miss. 1988).
72. See State v. Williams, 545 So. 2d 651, 654-55 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
73. See Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1351 (Miss. 1987).
74. See People v. Taylor, 524 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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regarding whether a proffered reason is pretextual, reviewing courts
are required to grant enormous deference to these findings.1s
Although the exact standard varies from state to state, generally a
reviewing court cannot reverse a ruling below unless, after assessing
the entire voir dire transcript, it " 'is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.' "76
Notwithstanding this extremely deferential standard of review,
20% of state77 and 10% of federal7 8 Batson cases in which the legitimacy of the prosecutor's explanation was an issue on appeal, were
reversed on the ground that the trial judge committed clear error in
accepting - as nondiscriminatory - the proffered explanation for
the peremptory challenge.79 In other words, in all of these cases,
the reviewing court was convinced after assessing the voir dire transcript that the prosecutor's reasons for the strike were pretextual,
which under Batson is the legal equivalent to proof of intentional
discrimination.
II. HicKs:

AL'IERING THE

McDONNELL DouoLAs FRAMEWORK

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision last term in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 80 the federal circuits were sharply divided
75. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) ("'[A] finding of intentional
discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court.
Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on
evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." (citation omitted)).
In particular, the Supreme Court has held that a trial court's factual findings - of which a
finding of pretext is one - may not be reversed on appeal even if the reviewing court is
"convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 57374 (1985).
76. Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
77. As of May 1, 1994, there were 378 state and 79 federal Batson cases in which the
appellant alleged that the trial judge committed clear error in accepting the prosecutor's
ostensibly race-neutral explanation for the challenged peremptory strike. Of the Batson
cases in state courts where pretext was an issue on appeal, 74 out of 378 were reversed because the reviewing court concluded that the prosecutor's explanation for the challenged
peremptory strike was pretextual. This search was accomplished by first searching the
Allstates-Allfeds directories on Westlaw for all cases which included the words Batson and
pretext. From this list of cases, the author counted those cases which were reversed for
pretext.
78. As of May 1, 1994, 8 out of 79 Batson cases in federal court where pretext was an
issue on appeal were reversed because the reviewing court concluded that the prosecutor's
explanation for the challenged peremptory strike was pretextual.
79. One possible conclusion that can be drawn from these reversal rates is that federal
and state trial judges are not adequately upholding the mandate of Batson. In fact, some
judges have expressed open hostility toward Batson. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 721
F. Supp. 1077, 1079-82 (E.D. Mo. 1989); People v. Banks, 609 N.E.2d 864, 871-72 {Ill. App.
Ct. 1993).
80. 113 s. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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on the question whether proof of pretext in a Title VII disparate
treatment case was equivalent, as a matter of law, to proof of intentional discrimination.8.1 In general, the appellate courts that addressed the issue adopted one of two distinct standards. Some
circuits embraced a "pretext-only" approach,82 treating proof of
pretext by the plaintiff as the legal equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination. In practice, this approach is the functional
equivalent to the current standard of proof in Batson cases. Other
circuits, however, advocated a pretext-plus approachS3 that only en81. Compare EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
establishing pretext does not mandate a finding of illegal discrimination); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 945
{1992); Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 {1st Cir. 1991) (same); Holder v. City
of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-28 {4th Cir. 1989) (same); Benzies v. Illinois Dept. of Mental
Health & Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1006 {1987); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983)
(same), with Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (ruling that
a finding pretext mandates finding intentional discrimination), revd., 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993);
Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2nd Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 880 (1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); 'fye v.
Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987);
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); Thornbrough v. Columbus &
Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 639-40, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Duffy v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3rd Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1087 (1984). Also, for a general discussion of the law prior to Hicks, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsuNGs L.J. 57 {1991).
82. See, e.g., Dister v. Continental Group, 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) (ruling that
"a plaintiff may prevail upon a showing that the employer's given legitimate reason is unworthy of credence"); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 {8th Cir. 1988) (finding
that "[a]s a matter of both common sense and federal law, an employer's submission of a
discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence which may
persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually occurred"); Chipollini
v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 {3d Cir.) {holding that "[i]f the plaintiff [shows] that
it is more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then the
employer's decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the evidence produced by
the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate fact of discriminatory intent"), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 647 (arguing that the plaintiff "is not
required to prove that the [defendant] was motivated by bad reasons; he need only persuade
the factfinder that the [defendant's] purported good reasons were untrue"); see also Lanctot,
supra note 81, at 71-81 (discussing in greater depth the arguments in favor of a "pretext-only"
approach).
83. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
"[i]f the presumption is rebutted, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to show
that the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual and that the employment decision was based on a sexually-discriminatory criterion"); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp.,
883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 {11th Cir. 1989) (finding that "merely establishing pretext, without
more, is insufficient to support a finding of racial discrimination"); Keyes v. Secretary of
Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) {ruling that "it was plaintiff's burden not only to
show that the defendant's proffered reasons for hiring someone else were apocryphal, but
that those reasons were pretexts aimed at masking sex or race discrimination"); Benzies, 810
F.2d at 148 {ruling that plaintiffs have "the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the
reasons advanced ••. are a pretext and that the substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision was discrimination and but for that discrimination, the plaintiff would have
been appointed"); see also Lanctot, supra note 81, at 81-91 {addressing the arguments in
favor of a "pretext-plus" standard).
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abled the factfinder to draw a permissible, rather than mandatory,
inference of discrimination from a finding of pretext. In practice,
pretext-plus courts often required the plaintiff not only to prove
that the employer's reason was pretextual, but also to offer additional evidence that discrimination was the real motivation behind
the adverse employment action.84 In contrast, pretext-only courts
presumed that discrimination was the real reason as soon as the
plaintiff proved that the employer's explanation was unworthy of
credence. In Hicks, the Supreme Court resolved this conflict in
favor of the pretext-plus courts, holding that proof of pretext alone
does not mandate a finding of intentional discrimination.
This Part analyzes the Court's decision in Hicks with particular
attention paid to its reasons for rejecting the principle that proof of
pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework is legally
equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination. This Part concludes that the Court was concerned that a "pretext-only" standard
subjected employers to an unreasonable risk of unwarranted
liability.
Prior to an administrative shake-up at St. Mary's Honor Center,
Melvin Hicks, a black shift commander, consistently received satisfactory job performance evaluations. Following a series of supervisory changes, however, he was subjected to "repeated, and
increasingly severe, disciplinary actions" which ultimately resulted
in his dismissal from the job.ss In response to his termination,
Hicks filed a race discrimination suit against St. Mary's. At the
trial, the court concluded that the justifications St. Mary's offered
for firing Hicks - the severity and accumulation of rules violations
- were merely pretextual because similarly situated white coworkers were not subjected to comparable disciplinary actions.s6
Notwithstanding this evidence of disparate treatment, the trial
judge ruled in favor of St. Mary's on the ground that Hicks had not
proven that the crusade to terminate him "was racially rather than
personally motivated."87 The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower
court ruling, concluding that by offering a pretextual reason for its
actions, St. Mary's had failed to rebut the prima facie case of
discrimination.ss
84. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
85. 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
86. See 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
87. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991), revd., 970
F.2d 487 {8th Cir. 1992), revd., 113 S. Ct. 2742 {1993).
88. Relying on existing precedent, Hicks argued on appeal that because he had successfully discredited St. Mary's proffered explanations for his tennination, he was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
In agreeing with Hicks, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that because "all of defendants' proffered reasons were discredited, defendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate
reason for their actions." Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 {8th Cir. 1992),
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The specific question presented to the Court -in Hicks89 was
whether the trier of fact in a Title VII disparate treatment case was
compelled to find for the plaintiff if it disbelieved the employer's
proffered reasons for taking an adverse employment action.9o A
sharply divided Court ruled that proof of pretext within the
McDonnell-Douglas framework did not, as a matter of law, mandate a judgment for the plaintiff.91 Rather, according to the majority, discrediting the defendant's proffered reasons for its action only
permits the trier of fact to draw a permissible inference that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.92
The Court's ruling in Hicks established the principle that an employer's unpersuasive or contrived justifications for an adverse employment action are not the equivalent to proof of intentional
discrimination.93 Implicit in the Court's holding was the view, previously expressed by various lower courts, that a wide variety of
reasons might exist for terminating an employee, none of which rise
to the level of violating Title VII.94 For example, an employer
might feel compelled to offer an explanation that it knows to be
false rather than admit in pleadings or open court that its actions
were actually the result of personal favoritism, dislike, politics, an
arbitrary decision, or clerical or administrative mistakes.95 Moreover, it is often the case that the defendant is a company that is
forced to rely on the testimony and recollection of various employees regarding their state of mind or the actions and motivations of
other employees,96 all of which makes it extremely difficult specifically to identify the "real" motivation for the adverse employment
action. Referring to this problem, the Hicks Court noted:
[T]he employer's 'proffered explanation,' his 'stated reasons,' his 'articulated reasons,' [do not] somehow exist apart from the record - in
some pleading, or perhaps in some formal, nontestimonial statement
made on behalf of the defendant to the factfinder. ("Your honor,
revd., 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Consequently, they "were in no better position than if they had
remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully
discriminated .•• on the basis of ... race." 970 F.2d at 492.
89. See 113 S. Ct. at 2742.
90. See 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
91. See 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
92. See 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
93. See 113 S. Ct. at 2756.
94. See Benzies v. Illinois Dept. of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d
146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
95. See 810 F.2d at 148; see also EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir.
1992) (arguing that "[h]uman relationships are inherently complex [and] ... employers must
deal with a multitude of employment decisions, involving different employees, different supervisors, different time periods, and an incredible array of facts that will inevitably differ
even among seemingly similar situations").
96. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754.
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pursuant to McDonnell Douglas the defendant hereby formally asserts, as its reason for the dismissal at issue here, incompetence of the
employee.") Of course it does not work like that.97

Relying on this reasoning, the Court concluded that a proof standard that regards pretext evidence as the legal equivalent to proof
of intentional discrimination risks unnecessarily subjecting faultless
employers to liability under Title VII.9s
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLYING

HICKS TO BATSON

Part III addresses the question of whether the Hicks standard of
proof should be applied in the Batson context. Section III.A argues
that because of the practical differences between Title VII and Batson cases, the reasoning in Hicks is inapplicable when applied to
cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
Section ill.B argues that the principles that motivated the Court's
ruling in Batson also would be undermined if its current proof
structure were altered along the lines suggested by Hicks.
A. An Argument Against Applying Hicks to Batson
As argued in Part II, two primary concerns motivated the
Court's decision in Hicks. First, in light of the wide variety of reasons for why an employer might fire an employee - many of which
may be considered illegitimate but nevertheless do not rise to the
level of violating Title VII - proving pretext should not carry
enormous evidentiary weight.99 In other words, even though an
employer may have offered an "incredible" reason for an adverse
employment action, it is too great a leap of logic to assume that
therefore the real motivation was racial animus.100 Second, because
proof of pretext is not necessarily affirmative proof of an intent to
discriminate, it is wrong to hold employers liable under Title VII
simply based on such a showing, because to do so would unfairly
result in liability for employers that may have acted arbitrarily but
not in violation of Title vrr.101
The problem with applying the logic of Hicks to Batson cases
simply because they both operate under the same McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting proof structure is that Title VII and Batson
cases are contextually distinct.
97. 113 S. Ct. at 2755.
98. See 113 S. Ct. at 2756 (noting that "Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only
against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason ••• of
race").
99. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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First, unlike a Title VII disparate treatment case, Batson objections do not require factfinders to analyze employment relationships, which by their nature often include individual personal
relationships that could factor - positively or negatively - into
employment decisions. Prosecutorial peremptory strikes are rarely
based on a personal relationship with the juror,102 virtually eliminating personal animosity as a factor.
Furthermore, the scope of evidence available on which to determine intentional discrimination differs greatly from the employment context to Batson. 103 The issues raised in Batson hearings do
not require the parties to conduct depositions and interrogatories,
read lengthy evidentiary records or hear from a multitude of witnesses. Rather, they only require the prosecutor to offer an explanation for his or her own strikes based on the transcribed voir dire
testimony of potential jurors, which itself has been taken in the
presence of all of the relevant parties. Equally important, however,
is the fact that in Batson cases the individuals that are called upon
to proffer an explanation for their actions are actually those responsible for exercising the peremptory challenge. Thus, Batson stands
in stark contrast to Title VII cases where employers are often required to rely on the testimony of individuals who were not actually
responsible for the adverse employment action.104 In other words,
there is no concern in Batson, as there is in the Title VII context, of
a prosecutor being bound by the statements or actions of others. In
Hicks, the majority emphasized the fact that Title VII employers
are not required to stand before the court and claim "[y]our honor,
pursuant to McDonnell Douglas the defendant hereby formally asserts, as its reason for the dismissal at issue here, incompetence of
the employee."105 But this is exactly what occurs in Batson hearings: under Batson, there is a concrete, contemporaneous justification given directly to the court by the individual responsible for the
strike.
Finally, it is clear that applying a Hicks standard in the context
of Batson has the potential to allow prosecutors successfully to mis102. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 68, at 252. Moreover, the existence of such a
personal relationship would more than likely give rise to a challenge for cause.
103. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2303 n.239 (1995):
In assessing whether criticisms of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in employment discrimination cases are relevant to Batson cases, it is important to note the very significant
differences between the two types of cases. Batson cases have no pretrial phase: no
pleading, no discovery, no pretrial memoranda. They therefore present none of the
usual methods for "smoking out" evidence and narrowing disputed issues. For that reason alone, it is dangerous to simply transfer doctrine from one setting to the other.
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
105. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2754 (1993); see also supra notes 9697 and accompanying text.
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lead, and even blatantly to lie, to a trial judge regarding their reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge. As the Supreme Court
has noted, however,
It is difficult to imagine that ... intentional violations of defendants'
constitutional rights by Government prosecutors who are officers of
the court charged with upholding the law would not have a considerable detrimental effect on the integrity of the process and call for judicial action designed to restore order and integrity to the process.106

With this principle in mind, it is difficult to imagine - in light of
the long history of prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge
- that altering the Batson proof structure along the lines suggested
by Hicks would have anything but a "detrimental effect on the integrity of the process" of selecting juries.
B.

The Implications of Applying Hicks to Batson

Part I of this Note focused on the Batson Court's purpose in
lowering the standard of proof required for a criminal defendant to
establish that the State has exercised a racially motivated peremptory challenge. It noted that the Court's ruling was influenced, at
least in part, by a concern over the widespread use of race-based
peremptory challenges, a practice that the Court clearly intended
Batson to counteract.107 The Court's decision to apply the
McDonnell Douglas proof structure in Batson cases, therefore, can
and should be understood as a means of facilitating this goa1.1os
But altering the Batson framework in accordance with Hicks would,
like Swain, have the practical effect of placing a higher burden of
proof on criminal defendants, thus making it more difficult to prove
that the State has exercised a racially motivated peremptory
challenge.
Furthermore, application of Hicks to the peremptory challenge
framework appears to conflict with Batson's premise that the peremptory challenge is "a practice 'providing the opportunity for discrimination.' "109 Unlike in the employment discrimination
context, where any number of legitimate reasons might explain an
employer's pretextual justification for dismissing an employee, Batson recognizes that pretextual justifications for peremptory strikes
almost certainly reveal discriminatory animus.no
106. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 522 (1983).
107. See supra notes 36, 41-42 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 44-47 (discussing why this proof structure is beneficial to parties
trying to establish intentional discrimination without direct proof).
109. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545,
552 (1967)).
110. See 476 U.S. at 96.
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If Hicks were applied to Batson, it would essentially reintroduce
a Swain-like presumption to peremptory challenge cases.111 By requiring more than a showing of pretext in the Title VII context,
Hicks creates a presumption, akin to that in Swain, that employment decisions, even those that are justified by pretextual reasons,
are presumptively nondiscriminatory unless intentional discrimination is affirmatively proven. The Batson presumption is the exact
opposite: the peremptory "permits 'those to discriminate who are
of a mind to discriminate.' "112
Application of Hicks to the peremptory challenge setting, for
example, would create uncertainty about the proper outcome in a
case like State v. Reliford113 where the government's explanation
for a strike proved to be pretextual. In Reliford, a state prosecutor
claimed that he removed a black juror because the juror knew the
defendant from church. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that
this explanation was pretextual because the prosecutor had not
struck a white juror who knew the defendant from work. 114 Under
the current Batson standard, Reliford is entitled to a new trial because it is presumed that the prosecutor's pretextual justification
for the peremptory challenge concealed a discriminatory intent.
But if Batson were altered along the lines suggested by Hicks, the
outcome in cases like Reliford, where the reason given is facially
neutral but pretextual, would be less than certain. What more
would the defendant need to show?
For a more extreme illustration, consider United States v.
Guevera.11s In Guevera, a federal prosecutor claimed that he used
a peremptory challenge to excuse a black woman from the jury
panel because she was an unemployed, single mother. 116 On appeal
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on
the ground that the prosecutor's reason was pretextual because the
struck juror was "married, childless, and employed at the same casino as other [white] jurors who were not challenged." 117 Under a
Hicks framework, the trial judge or reviewing court could have
found that the prosecutor's explanation was wholly unsupported by
the record, yet still rule in favor of the prosecutor on the ground
that the defendant had only proven pretext and not racial
discrimination.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See supra note 30.
476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
753 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
See 753 S.W.2d at 11.
No. 92-10005, 1993 WL 68944 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 1993).
See 1993 WL 68944, at *l.
1993 WL 68944, at *l.
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In practice, therefore, a prosecutor could offer a patently false
justification for a strike and then argue, notwithstanding the lack of
a credible explanation for his actions, that the defendant is not entitled to judgment because he has failed to offer sufficient evidence
to support a finding that the strike was race-based. Such a standard
clearly has the potential to enable prosecutors to mask racial discrimination in the jury selection process by relying on a tool - a
peremptory challenge - that is by its nature susceptible to
misuse. 118
Finally, it is important to note that in the vast majority of cases,
the most that the defense can prove is pretext. Hicks calls for a
direct showing of intentional discrimination,119 which would be impossible in the Batson context because aside from pretext there is
little evidence available to the defendant. Barring a prosecutor's
use of a racial slur during voir-dire, or some similarly improbable
misstep, it is hard to imagine what evidence of discrimination could
exist aside from proof of pretext.
CONCLUSION

Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny are a powerful statement by
the Court regarding .the importance of eradicating racial discrimination from the jury selection process. In overruling Swain, a twentyone year old unanimous precedent,120 the Batson Court decried
Swain's "crippling burden of proof'121 and adopted a new standard
of proof specifically aimed at easing the burden on criminal
defendants.
Although Batson itself has not succeeded fully, in practice it has
proven far more effective than Swain in the struggle to combat the
use of discriminatory peremptory challenges.122 As a result, it is
particularly important that the decision in Hicks not be extended to
the Batson context. Applying Hicks to Batson, in effect, would
reestablish a Swain-like presumption in cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Prosecutors' peremptory
strikes would once again become "largely immune from constitu118. See supra notes 109, 112 and accompanying text. Although some may take offense
to the implication that prosecutors would intentionally exercise racially motivated peremp·
tory challenges, one need only look to the plethora of cases in recent years in which race has
been an underlying or explicit element in the case to realize the influence that a consideration such as race must play in the selection of juries.
119. See supra Part II.
120. The parties were so confident that the Court would not overrule Swain that the
equal protection issues were not even briefed. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 112-16
(1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
121. 476 U.S. at 92.
122. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 68; Barton, supra note 44, at 214 (describing
Batson as a "virtual sieve").
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tinal scrutiny."123 As a result, both the jury selection process and
our system of justice would suffer from the debilitating effects of
regularly exercised discriminatory peremptory challenges, and the
project begun in Batson - the elimination of discrimination from
the selection of juries - would be endangered.

123. 476 U.S. at 92.

